CoachMac’s Blog

As many folks already know, I will be leaving John Carroll at the end of the school year to pursue a career in basketball down at The Basketball Academy and Pro Training Center at IMG Academies in Bradenton, Florida.  It is been an amazing five year run, and I have had the opportunity to work with quite a few fine young men here at John Carroll.  The opportunity to work with athletes at such a high level was granted to me by the first head coach I worked under, Larry Burton, then continued under Tom Vierheller, and finally now with Coach Tony Martin.  Coach Martin has opened many doors and provided numerous avenues for me to grow as a coach and a person, and to him I will be eternally grateful.  We have developed a great friendship that I am sure will continue many years into the future.

Over the last three years, I have seen a program grow from the ground up.  I have seen a few boys mature into young men, each taking advantage of their athletic opportunities and move on to the collegiate level.  With meticulous planning and many hours spent, I helped organize and execute a plan to elevate the school’s level play.  Coach Martin’s leadership and experience was invaluable.  Along the way, I was given the chance to grow my passion for skill development with numerous individuals and with teams.

One player I developed a great relationship with was John Carroll Class of 2007 graduate Ryan Horka.  I coached Ryan in my first year as a head coach at the JV level, and then he asked me to help with his off-season training regimen.  It was there I first got the taste for skill development that spurred me to this point.  Seeing Ryan grow (literally and figuratively) was a real joy.  Eventually watching him sign on to continue his academic and basketball career at Catholic University of America was very satisfying, because I knew that the work he had put in over those years was really paying off for him.

Another player that most know I had a very close relationship with is the soon-to-graduate Jakub Kusmieruk.  Following his junior year, Jakub sought me out and asked me to work with him almost exclusively during that spring and summer.  We worked nearly non-stop, six days a week, with a complete plan in mind for improvement.  Jakub was a fine worker and became a great friend.  With his size and work ethic, combined with his relative inexperience playing the game (just over 3 years counting as of now), he will have a chance to be something very special with time.  Again, his decision to sign early with the University of Central Florida was a source of pride for me, and I know he is excited to start there in the fall.

Jakub coming to JC actually signaled the genesis for my upcoming move to IMG Academies.  During his first year at John Carroll, I came across a coaching DVD from the Five Star “Building a Champion Player” series: The Rebounder.  This DVD featured a trainer named Coach David Thorpe.  I did some research, and contacted Coach Thorpe by email.  We discussed training ideas for Jakub, and eventually, he invited Coach Martin and I to bring Jakub down to train with him for a week.  We accepted.  At the time, he was working on his own out of a small gym in Clearwater, Florida.  That was an eye-opening experience for me.  I can remember thinking that doing what Coach Thorpe did is what I wanted to do with basketball.

The following year, Jakub returned for a week of training with Coach Thorpe.  He had, at that point, moved his Pro Training Center under the umbrella of IMG Academies in Bradenton, Florida.  We really enjoyed our visit, and I told Coach Martin that this was the kind of place I could see myself working.  IMG is a sports academy—they train middle school and high school players year round on a full-time basis and also provide training to college and professional players during their off-seasons—and the environment there seemed to fit my personality and my desire to have a more basketball-centered career.  I met with the Director of The Basketball Academy, Coach Mike Moreau, and discussed with him any possibilities for the future.  I left there thinking this might someday be a good place.

Fast forward to March of this year.  I received a call from Coach Moreau who wanted to discuss a position at The Basketball Academy with me.  After a month of discussion, thought, and decisions, my wife and I decided that it was such a unique opportunity that we could not say no.  And so, after the school year is over, I will head down to a new position as Basketball Sales Manager and Player Development Specialist at The Basketball Academy and Pro Training Center at IMG Academies.  I will be driving their full-time program marketing and sales while having the opportunity to get on the floor with middle-school, high school, college, and pro players.  Who knows what the future will hold—all I know is this is a next step, and a new opportunity.

Time to move forward!

In conjunction with this opportunity, it looks like I will also be contributing to BasketballProspectus.com, writing about individuals, gameplans, scouting, and other items from a coach’s perspective.  Be on the lookout on that site for my articles.

The blog will go on… no fear.  Wish me luck!

When the Phoenix Suns originally traded for Shaquille O’Neal, I felt it would work out well offensively, given the time to develop.  By and large, that has been true.  However, I also thought at the time that Phoenix would have real problems defending the ball screen, as I said in my blog post that looked at the trade.

These defensive deficiencies were no more apparent than in Games 1, 2, and 3 of the Suns’ first round matchup with the reigning champion San Antonio Spurs.  Phoenix really struggled to contain Tony Parker and Manu Ginobli off of ball screens, for a few different reasons.  The primary problem for the Suns is that their big players are either unable (Shaq) or unwilling (Amare Stoudemire) to aggressively attack the ball screen.  The standard defensive strategy for defending the ball screen in the NBA is the hard hedge.  This method involves the defender of the screener jumping out high on the top hip of the screener.  The on-ball defender forces the ball-handler to use the screen, but instead of coming off the screener’s hip with the ability to turn the corner and get into the lane, the ball-handler must take a less than direct route around the hedging defender.  This allows the on-ball defender to recover before too much damage is done.  Because the hard hedge involves the screener’s defender to jump out high to contain the dribble, it is difficult for the more slow-of-foot (or the mentally reluctant) defender to execute.

In Game 4, the blowout Phoenix win, the Suns made two notable adjustments to their defense of the ball screen.  First, they rarely attempted to do what they don’t do well: hedge.  They kept the defender of the screener back in the lane to protect the paint to whatever degree possible.  Second, every Phoenix defender on the floor immediately moved into a pack-style defense whenever the Spurs looked to go ball screen.  Pack-style defense means any off-ball defender must move as close to the lane as they can to eliminate penetration.  This tactic gives up the jump-shot—either the ball-handler will find a seam to shoot the basketball or the screener can shape up to the ball following the screen for a pick & pop type catch & shoot action.  Since the Spurs were not their normal shooting selves, this became a blowout quickly in the Suns’ favor.

Coming into Game 5, there was little doubt San Antonio would make some offensive adjustments to the Suns’ defensive strategy from the previous game.  The most obvious one is the speed with which the Spurs attacked.  In Game 4, the Spurs took their time getting into sets and plays, which allowed Phoenix to consistently re-examine matchups and spacing, meaning that whenever the ball screen was used, the Suns could set their defense and ensure that each player was accounted for.  In Game 5, however, there was a concerted effort on the part of the ball-handlers to enter into ball screen situations well before the Suns’ defense was set.  This prevented Phoenix from zoning up with the off-ball defenders in a help capacity and again exposed their ball screen defense.

The Suns used two defensive tactics early in the game to try to defend the ball screen.  The primary strategy was the no-hedge sag.  This was similar to what worked in Game 4.  In addition, Phoenix occasionally got caught up in a switch, particularly with Stoudemire defending.  Either way, the Suns stayed back, sagging in the lane and giving up the jumper, both to the ball-handler and to the screener.

Despite the similar method being used in Game 5 that was so successful in Game 4, early on, the Suns were a step too slow with the rest of their defenders, allowing the ball-handler to get entirely too deep after turning the corner on the screen.  Throughout the first quarter, the Spurs ran screen and roll/pop nearly as effectively as they had in Games 1-3.  However, at the start of the second quarter, the Suns began to recognize the speed with which San Antonio entered the ball screen.  This realization led to a much more committed Pack-line defense for the Suns, and much more energetic and purposeful movements for the off-ball defenders so they could really been in position to alter or block shots in the lane. 

By the end of the half, though, Parker and Ginobli had adjusted to some degree again, not settling for jump shots and instead attacking the rim with reckless abandon.  This change put the onus back onto the Suns, who were unable to match the level of commitment defensively to preventing penetration that the Spurs were willing to put into breaking down the defense with their dribble assault.

The story of the second half dealt entirely with how dedicated the Suns’ defensive team was to limiting the penetration of Parker and Ginobli off the ball screen.  When Phoenix was engaged mentally as a team and devoted their attention to not allowing easy paths to the middle and to the rim, they were very good.  When the Suns did not do accomplish this task, San Antonio gave them some issues.  It was a simple matter of attention to detail in execution, and defensively, that attention to detail was not consistent during Game 5.

I wonder if two small adjustments would have worked better against the ball screen.  When Parker is the ball-handler, going underneath the screen and inviting Parker to shoot the jumper while limiting his penetration seems the best bet.  There will be games he will hit everything (Game 3) but those games are the exception, not the rule.  With the defender going over the top of the screen, it meant the big man defending the screener was alone on an island only briefly, and with Parker’s quickness, that is a dangerous situation.  The other adjustment would come into play when Ginobli is the ball-handler.  In this situation, the defender on the ball should jump out on top of the screen, “busting” the screen and forcing the ball-handler back the other way.  This strategy gives the screening defender a chance to be in the correct position the entire time, rather than playing a guessing game.  It will leave the screener open on pick & pop, but the Suns were willing to give that up anyway, and it was the ball-handler that was killing them in Game 5.

With Mike D’Antoni reportedly on the hotseat (really a poor move, if he is fired), I am sure next year’s coach will be much more defensive minded and offensively conservative (a Van Gundy type).  It will be interesting to see how their approach to defending the ball screen changes with the roster as currently constructed.

I am sad to see the Suns depart the playoffs this year.  We will see what their future holds this offseason.  In the meantime—its’ time to look ahead!

Ever hear folks say that basketball is a fun sport but that only the last few minutes REALLY matter?  This is the first in a series of articles that will provide possession-by-possession breakdown of the last five minutes of selected games from the 2008 NBA Playoffs—games that are competitive and seemingly could go either way heading into the last few minutes of action.

The story of the last few minutes of Game 4 between the Cleveland Cavaliers and the Washington Wizards was the amount of attention the Wizards were forced to pay to LeBron James on the defensive side and the inability of the Wizard offense to execute down the stretch, relying on forced shots against a staunch Cavalier defense.

Coming out of a timeout with 5:07 remaining and Cleveland up by 6 (93-87), Washington looked to enter offense using their high post shuffle cut entry.  Cleveland’s strong denial of Gilbert Arenas after he gave the ball up initially forced Antawn Jamison to double back and enter into a dribble-handoff with DeShawn Stevenson on the wing.  Stevenson was able to go strong right hand drive and kick to Caron Butler in the corner, whose shot rimmed out and was rebounded by Cleveland’s James.

On Cleveland’s offensive side, the Cavs set up Delonte West high with the ball in screen and pop action with Zydrunas Ilgauskas.  West did not engage the defense except to drive directly at James’ defender, which allowed LeBron to step up and receive the handoff on the wing.  This put the entire Washington defense on alert, and immediately five white shirts entered the paint to protect the area from LeBron’s drive.  This set up Ilgauskas on the delayed pick and pop in the corner, and James hit him for the 17 footer.  Though Z missed the shot, this did demonstrate how the Wizards would guard the Cavs for the last few minutes.

In early offense coming down the opposite way, Jamison set a flare screen for Stevenson who faded toward the wing from the top, receiving the ball for a one-pass three that rimmed hard and out.  LeBron grabbed the rebound and was fouled.  He went on to make one of two free throws, putting the Cavs up 94-87 with 4:21 remaining.

After the make, Cleveland went to its fullcourt defense, attempting to prevent the Wizards from advancing the ball quickly and forcing them to use more of the shot clock than they may like.  In the halfcourt, the Wizards went high screen and roll with Haywood setting the pick for Butler.  Since Haywood is not a threat to shoot the jumper, his defender (Ilgauskas) elected to stay home in the paint.  However, Z got lost in between guarding the ball-handler (Butler) and the roll man (Haywood), and his indecision cost Cleveland.  Fearful of giving up an open three on the wing, Cleveland did not help on the penetration and Butler found his way to the basket, drawing Ilgauskas enough to pass behind him to Haywood for the slam.  Great execution from Washington.  Cleveland still led, 94-89, with just under 4:00 remaining.

LeBron brought the ball down the floor, and miscommunication between he and West led to the ball being thrown away by James.  It looked like James thought they would be running the same play as they had run last time down the floor, while West had other ideas.  This was Cleveland’s eighth turnover of the second half, compared to just one for Washington.

On the ensuing possession, Washington went side screen and roll, again featuring Haywood (with Ilgauskas guarding him) and Butler.  Just as the San Antonio Spurs attempt to force Shaquille O’Neal guard the ball-screen to expose his lack of mobility, the Wizards did the same.  Because his last attempt to guard the ball-screen resulted in easy penetration from Butler and led to the dunk from Haywood, Ilgauskas hard hedged the screen this time.  However, his hedge was too aggressive, and Butler changed direction and exploded through, splitting the defenders and leaving Ilgauskas in the dust.  James slid under the screen and attempted to regain defensive position in front of Butler, but was unsuccessful, as Butler reversed direction and tossed in a runner in the lane.  The Wizards had pulled to within three, as Cleveland now led 94-91, with 3:41 left.

Cleveland again ran a similar high ball screen for West, who did not attack the defense and instead passed it to LeBron on the wing.  Ilgauskas now changed direction and went to screen for James.  LeBron toyed with the screen, stringing out the help defender slightly before changing speed and direction with a strong burst into the lane.  The entire Washington defense collapsed on James, and he was free to kick the ball to Ben Wallace, who turned and found Daniel Gibson on the wing.  Gibson launched the catch-and-shoot three which fell, and gave the Cavaliers a six point lead again, now with 3:17 left.

Washington ran a double ball screen for Butler again, who found Haywood who missed the short shot in the lane, but the ball squired out of bounds off of the Cavs.  On the inbounds play, James picked up a cheap foul guarding Butler.  Again with the ball, the Wizards ran misdirection handoffs out top and Stevenson off of baseline screens down low.  Stevenson caught the ball off the wing in catch-and-shoot mode.  His three, however, was off the mark, and now Cleveland has their first chance to really put the game away.

LeBron again drives the ball hard middle, collapsing the defense, and kicks out to an open West who fires a three that rims out hard.  While the drive and kick from LeBron is a strong basketball play, the wisdom of that shot with ten seconds on the shot clock could be questioned.  The Wizards corralled the rebound and were now given new life—2:30 remained in the game, with the Cavaliers still up six.

After a timeout from Washington, the Wizards ran the same misdirection handoffs out top with Stevenson working off of baseline screens.  However Butler took the ball up top and went one-on-one with James on an isolation.  Because the rest of the Cavaliers were guarding off the ball with a lot of motion, there was no help for James who ended up guarding Butler on an island.  Butler shook James and shot a 17-foot jumper that drew nothing but net.  Cleveland remained ahead, 97-93, with 2:10 left.

Looking to take advantage of the attention being paid to LeBron this late in the game, Cleveland ran wide post up for James on the left wing.  James went into triple-threat mode, but instead of attacking middle which is always the preferred method, James instead went to his step-back jumper on the baseline side, missing the shot badly.  The ball careened out of bounds off of Jamison, however, so the Cavs retained possession.  With the ball coming in from underneath the basket, Cleveland went to their loose stack play, which involves screening for LeBron cutting down the gut and a spin and seal from Ilgauskas.  Concerned about LeBron’s cut, Washington stayed home in the lane, and when Ilgauskas spun back to the ball, he was open for the 18 foot jump shot.  He received the pass and fired the shot, but again it was off.  LeBron’s presence on the floor had created an open shot for a teammate, which was definitely a portend of things to come.

Washington’s ensuing possession was not at all what had been successful for them leading up to that point.  Arenas came off a walled double screen, penetrated halfway down the lane but hand nowhere else to go.  Instead of kicking out and trying to get a better shot, Arenas forced a pass into Haywood in the post, who missed the baseline hook with eight seconds remaining on the shot clock.  At this point, Cleveland’s defense really stepped up, and would remain at a high level throughout the rest of the contest.  It is interesting to note that Butler did not touch the ball on this possession.

Cleveland came down and ran (guess what?) high screen and roll, this time with James attacking off the Ilgauskas pick.  James again collapsed the Washington defense, kicking to Wallace who swung it out to Gibson for three.  Gibson’s shot clanged hard and went out of bounds, another questionable shot with 14 seconds remaining on the shot clock.

Again with possession and down just four with less than a minute remaining, I definitely thought we’d see Butler receive the ball.  However, that was not to be, as Arenas was operating on the wing, drove the ball to the elbow where he was cut off by West, and then found himself with nowhere to go.  Arenas was lucky to be fouled by West, or this was a turnover waiting to happen.  Arenas does salvage the possession with two made free throws, cutting the Cleveland lead to just two with 57.1 seconds remaining, 97-95.  The Cavs called timeout to diagram their next play.

Based on previous plays, house money was on Cleveland running either high screen and roll or a play to get LeBron in the post.  They chose the former, and LeBron came off the screen looking to lean in and draw the foul on a pull-up jumper from the foul line.  The jumper banged off the rim but this did give the chance for Cleveland to see how Washington would defend in the final minute.  Cleveland’s offense had stalled slightly, and it was up to Washington to take advantage.

Washington would do so, again running some misdirection handoffs out high.  However, Arenas was determined to leave his mark on this game, and drove hard middle.  He reversed direction and took an off-balance leaner which banked home.  It was a tremendous shot, but if you are Cleveland, you are happy with your defense.  They took, and made, a very difficult shot, and had to expend a lot of energy to get that shot.  Tie game, 97 all, with 27.1 seconds remaining.

Cleveland elects not to take a timeout.  In this situation, it is the right play.  This prevents Washington from completely setting their defense, or getting a better lineup on the floor.  They went into their box set, from which they usually run high screen and roll with Ilgauskas.  However, LeBron waves Ilgauskas off, not wanting another defender out with him.  Had Cleveland called a timeout, my guess is that Washington would have run an extra defender at LeBron to get the ball out of his hands early.  However, there was no time to do so here.  LeBron, with eight seconds left on the shot clock and eleven on the game clock, broke the defense down after a crossover.  Arenas stayed on the elbow, helping off of West who was on the wing.  As LeBron penetrated, West faded toward the corner, creating a larger gap for Arenas to close.  As soon as Arenas sensed LeBron was pulling up on his penetration, he recovered defensively to West, but it was too late.  James’ pass was on the mark, hitting West in his shooting pocket on the left side, giving him every opportunity to get the shot up and off over Arenas’ outstretched arm.  The shot was true, falling through the net and giving Cleveland a 100-97 lead with just 5.4 remaining.

The Wizards called timeout, allowing them to advance the ball to halfcourt.  With five seconds remaining, there would be a chance to create some kind of screening action to create a shot for a shooter.  Perhaps a ball-screen with the screener a three point threat would be appropriate, with some kind of flare screening action on the strong side in case there is an opportunity for a kick-out.  On Cleveland’s side, the announcers wondered aloud if the Cavaliers would foul prior to the shot going up to prevent any game-tying scenario.  Hubie Brown felt that Cleveland should foul because there was only five seconds remaining.  While I agree in the college game, a foul is the best to prevent any emotional game-tying heroics.  However, in the NBA, I think the defenders are good enough and the fact that you can set your defense following a timeout means that it can be your choice to foul depending on the situation.

The play for Washington involved Arenas setting a screen for Butler to go to the ball-side corner, then come off a double screen down high.  Cleveland put a defender (Gibson) on the ball out of bounds, preventing that player from stepping in for the easy shot.  Arenas caught the ball high, guarded by West.  Just as their on-ball defense had stifled Washington and forced them into low-percentage, contested shots, the Cavalier defense was again up to the challenge.  West pushed Arenas to his left and challenged him without fouling, leading to a short, flat three-point attempt from Arenas which harmlessly fell off the rim as the buzzer sounded.

Summary:

The last few minutes was a case study in how a player like LeBron James forces defenses to really change the way they play, and how if that player can pass the ball effectively, he still creates great shot opportunities for his teammates.  Most teams defend Carmelo Anthony similarly to the way they defend LeBron; however, Carmelo is not as willing or as effective a passer, and so his team’s offense tends to wilt in the final minutes as teams ratchet up their defense.  On the other side, we saw a team that was effectively executing their offense and scoring out of it, but then changed to more isolation sets and found their offense become stagnant and not as effective.  The lesson from both?  Go with what works – and do it until the other team stops it consistently.  The Cavs rode their horse, which they had done all game, and now will ride James into a potential series-clinching Game 5 this coming Wednesday.

Chris Paul has had a remarkable rise to quickly become recognized as the best point guard in the NBA today and there is no reason to think his reputation will not grow to become known as one of the best since the “big three” (Magic Johnson, John Stockton, and Isiah Thomas).  After an utterly transcendent Games 1 & 2 of the opening round of the 2008 playoffs (Paul averaged 33.5 points on 64% shooting and 13.5 assists over the first two games), Paul was brought down to earth to some degree in Game 3 (16 points on 22% shooting with 10 assists), when the Mavericks used Jason Terry on Paul to neutralize his quickness as much as possible.  Let’s take a look at how the changes the Mavericks made following the first two games by examining their defensive gameplan in Game 4.

Fullcourt “D”

The Mavs opened up using Terry again on Paul in token full-court pressure.  This is specifically designed to prevent Paul from getting a full head of steam and hopefully attempt to wear on him.  In Games 1 & 2, the Mavericks attacked Paul with multiple defenders as they had a big (Erick Dampier) stay up in denial of Paul and another defender (Jason Kidd at first) matched up over the top. Paul’s quickness hurt the Mavs though, as if he did make a catch despite the denial, it meant he could get past the initial defenders and create outnumbered situations.

This more conservative approach serves to limit the numerical advantages that can be created in the fullcourt, especially in early offense.  While it is more conservative than the tactic employed in the first two games, it still means that Paul must face consistent ball pressure no matter where he is on the floor and prevents him from getting into an easy groove or from seeing the floor without difficulty.

In Transition

Because of Chris Paul’s ability to change speeds at will, he is nearly impossible to guard as he gets into the attack zone with a head of steam.  The Mavericks chose to sag on him in the lane, preventing his ability to get into the lane beyond the free throw line and basically “daring” him to shoot jumpers.  In a pick-your-poison kind of situation, this approach prevents the kind of lob dunks and penetrate & pitch threes that Paul provides to Tyson Chandler and Peja Stojakovic, respectively.  These are the kind of plays that the young Hornets thrive on, and the kind of plays that they use to inspire their defense.  The more they can be limited, the better.

Paul must take better advantage of these situations in order to best help his team.  He must do one of two things to make the Mavericks pay for using this strategy.  First option is to drive into the gut of the defense and make them stop him.  If and when he is stopped, a jump stop and dish or kick will be available.  The more he can suck defenders in the better, and if he stops halfway because of the sagging defender, he plays right into the Mavericks’ hands.  His other option is to stop and pop the quick jumper.  Paul tends to be too unselfish to comfortably make this choice, but he must become a threat to bring the defender out of the sag.  Jannero Pargo effectively made this choice twice early in the second quarter during a big Hornets run.

The Ball Screen

The Mavericks used a host of different techniques in defending the ball screen, and each was based on who the screener was in that given situation.

On any screen with a non-jumpshooting big (like Chandler or Hilton Armstrong) as the screen setter, the Mavs sent Paul’s defender under the screen.  The defender on the screener would lay back in the lane as the big was not a jump shooting threat in the pick and pop.  Again, the idea is to limit the opportunities Paul and his teammates have at the rim.

When the screener was a shooting threat without overwhelming size or athleticism (Stojakovic, for example), the Mavs switched the screen and took their chances with a defender like Josh Howard guarding Paul.  This caused some issues for the Mavericks as the switch tended to force rotations on the backline which Paul took advantage of with timely and on-point passing.  However, the switching did keep Paul out of the lane, which is the main goal.

When a capable shooting big (i.e., David West) set the screen, the Mavericks hard hedged the screen, then recovered back to men quickly after Paul used the screen.  This approach limited easy looks at the basket for West and forced Paul high over the screening area, giving his defender the chance to recover before Paul could turn the corner and get into the lane.  This is the most traditional way for guarding the ball screen, but if defenders are lazy trying to execute it, Paul will make them pay.

This approach is very different from the first two games, and even a departure from some of what they did in Game 3, as in all three games, the central approach was to hard hedge the screen and/or trap it no matter who set the screen.  While conventional wisdom is to trap a superior ball-handler coming off an on-ball screen, the Mavericks rotations were so poor in the first two games that Paul’s quickness allowed him to split the defenders and get into lane having beaten 2/5^ths of the defense.  Again, much like their approach to guarding Paul in the fullcourt, the Mavs’ conservative method was effective in preventing numerical advantages in which Paul thrives.

On Closeouts & Penetration

On most closeouts on Paul, defenders approached in a soft manner with their feet, prepared to take an immediate retreat step at the first sign of penetration.  They kept hands at or above their shoulders, ready to deflect any potential passes into the interior.  This closeout limited the quick first step Paul possesses and again “dared” him to become a jump shooter.  Paul must be willing, able, and ready to knock down jumpshots when the chance presents it. The more Paul learns this, as both Stockton and Thomas did with time, the more effective he will be in creating chances for his teammates.  A great example of a player who does this today is Steve Nash.  No one ever calls Nash selfish, but he does consistently shoot open jumpshots when they come his way.

Whenever Paul was able to penetrate past the 20 foot marker, all five defenders took one step toward him.  If this slowed him down enough for his own defender to recover, that was the perfect possession.  If it did not slow him down enough for his man to recover, the other four Mavericks on the floor returned to their men anyway.  This stunt and recover tactic is specifically designed to prevent easy kickouts and/or dishes (and lobs) and to force Paul to finish in the lane.  Again, studying the tendencies of Nash would really benefit Paul’s development here.

Random Notes & Summary

Kidd was only sparingly used on Paul during the course of the game, as Dallas coach Avery Johnson elected to stay with Jason Terry defensively.  This strategy paid off, as Terry has seemingly bought-in to being the CP3-stopper.  It has also fueled Terry’s offensive output, as he is being very aggressive on that end of the floor for Dallas.

Paul was more effective in the third quarter of Game 4, not due to any specific changes by him or by deliberate adjustments by Dallas, but rather due to some defensive breakdowns and failures of execution on the part of the Mavericks.  Paul found his way into the lane, largely off of ball screens where the Mavs did not read the screener as effectively as they had in the first half.

Despite New Orleans’ victory in Game 4, there is little doubt that Dallas’ defense of Paul was the best of the series so far.  A glance at Paul’s line reveals the gameplan’s effectiveness: he scored 16 on just 43% shooting while handing out only 8 assists. Many of these stats inflated after the Hornets had increased to a 15-point lead and Dallas had to abandon their original gameplan.  In this game, it was the Mavericks’ inability to score on the offensive end that was their undoing.  From a game like this, in spite of the outcome, future opponents will have a blueprint by which to defend Paul.

This blueprint’s most significant lesson to be learned in defending Chris Paul is that a more traditional, conservative approach, limiting Paul’s opportunities at numerical advantages, is the “best” way to go.  He is a very talented player, but his nature and the way he truly becomes involved is when the entire defense is geared up and aggressive toward him.  He is a rare player that actually improves the more defenses over-extend against him.

This is not to say there isn’t a place to come after Paul—and in fact, mixing in the occasional hard trap or chest-to-chest denial should be a part of the repertoire—but the best thing to do the majority of the time is to not allow him to involve everyone and force him to beat you by himself.  There will be games he does this and makes it look easy, and we know with a superstar there is no perfect answer.  These are the “CP3 rules” on the defensive side.  At least until Paul turns soft defenses inside-out by taking full advantage of opportunities to score—then he becomes a complete player—and maybe joins the ranks of the best of all-time.

A few weeks ago, it was reported that University of Louisville sophomore power forward Derrick Caracter would be declaring for the NBA draft.  Apparently he had stopped going to class completely, and his ongoing feud with Coach Rick Pitino has been so well-documented that I needn't even find the links to verify the situation.  Caracter is well-known in high school basketball circles.  He was "the best player" in his class until somewhere around the 10th grade.  He could do a great many things on a basketball court, and imposed his 6'8, 260 pound frame on anyone who got in his way.  That is, when he wanted to.  Caracter never lived up to the advanced billing.  Nationally, doubts about his work ethic and his (no pun intended) character came along sometime during his sophomore year of high school.  He was still a highly recruited player, and since both he and I are from New Jersey, I rooted for him to figure it out, to have some kind of epiphany, and to mature into the player everyone thought he could be.  Just so that everyone is clear on how good Caracter could have been... many thought he could have been a more athletic Elton Brand.

When he started at Louisville, I thought Rick Pitino was exactly the kind of coach that Caracter needed.  Coach Pitino is demanding and stern.  He is successful and has immediate credentials as an accomplished coach and a reputation for putting players in a position to make it into the NBA.

If Pitino couldn't quite crack Caracter, I'm not sure anyone could.

Today, news was released that Caracter wants to return to Louisville, despite his earlier declaration.  He has not hired an agent, and apparently he is attending class.  He is texting Coach Pitino each day, imploring him to take him back on the team.  Pitino is steadfast, however, that Caracter will be better off going to the draft, and if he is not selected (it is doubtful he would be selected), he should go on to a professional career in Europe.  Pitino is even quoted as saying that a transfer would not be in Caracter's best interest, as he simply is not a hard enough worker.

I am an eternal optimist.  I have seen some pretty tough nuts crack, particularly when confronted wih a real and certain choice, one that has actual consequences.  At the same time, there are times when nothing can be done to save the situation, and like a tumor, the coach must cut the cancer away to save the whole.

It is a sad situation that is happening for Derrick Caracter.  I will continue to hope, wish, and pray the best for him, because that is my nature.  But hopefully the lesson of this young man's inability to grasp the reality of his situation can be a learning tool for others not to go down his path.

Best of luck, Derrick, no matter where life takes you next.

This does mean it looks like there will be a 6'8 260 lb athlete available to anyone willing to take on the headaches and heartaches that go with him.  I guarantee there will be someone.

Just about an hour from the first game of the 2008 NBA Playoffs - and I'm finally getting around to writing a preview.  I'm going to preview this playoff from the point of view of one of the statistics that I've mentioned before, assist to field goal ratio.  I believe this statistic can be used as an evaluative tool both offensively and defensively.  For the purposes of this evaluation, I took total statistics for the season and set up a ratio for offensive assists:FGM and compared it with the assists:FGM of that team's opponents.  I am using both the ratios themselves and the differential between a team and its opponents.

First, the rationale for A:FGM as a statistic than can help us evaluate team performance.  It is generally accepted, among coaches and fans, that effective passing leads to easy scores.  The more easy scores a team gets, generally, the more efficient an offense.  Teams that average more assists per field goal scored generally score more easy baskets, whether it be because of a great transition game, effective screening, or (quite simply) more talent.  The "magic number" that I like to see for a championship-caliber team is .60 or better.  In other words, if a team assists on more than 60% of their made field goals, they are getting great looks and converting those looks into points.  The same rationale applies to the defensive end; that is, the better job a team does limiting the number of field goals from assists, the better.  As a coach, I want my team to take another team out of what they do best.  Since most offenses are built on ball movement and passing, the more we can prevent them from getting easy scores out of their passing game (or transition), the lower their A:FGM will be.  On the defensive side, a championship-caliber team keeps their opponents below .50 on the scale.  In other words, their opponents assist on less than half of their field goals.  Generally, this means that their opponents have to rely on one-on-one basketball and have been taken out of their offense.

While these numbers are not perfect (are any?), they do have some basis in history.  Last year's champs, the San Antonio Spurs, had an offensive A:FGM of .605 and a defensive A:FGM of .495.  The only other team in the league that met the "championship criteria" last year was the Phoenix Suns, who were at .626 on offense and .478 on defense--better than the eventual champion Spurs.  Most people last year felt the Suns had as good a shot as anyone last year to win it all, including me.  The suspensions really got in the way.  The year before, the Miami Heat did not meet either of above-establishe criteria during the regular season.  They had the one thing that can blow up this statistical measure: an unbelievably dominant player in Dwyane Wade.  The 2005 champion Spurs met the criteria on the offensive side and barely missed it on the defensive side, losing it by a hundreth of a point.  So, while it's not a guarantee, we can at least get a sense of who the favorites are.

With all that said, let's see what the numbers say for this year.  Drumroll, please...

Only one team in the league is a lock championship-contender according to the criteria we set earlier.  The Phoenix Suns were only behind the Utah Jazz in offensive A:FGM, with a ratio of .644 (we'll hit the Jazz in a minute).  What is most startling about the Suns, though, is their defensive A:FGM.  It is so low (lowest out of playoff teams, in fact) that I rechecked the statistics three separate times.  With a .478 defensive A:FGM, the Suns are a team that takes their opponents out of what they want to do.  Whether it be their style of play enticing teams to run and gun and play as individuals or Shaq's presence preventing offensive rebounds and intimidating what used to be easy scores, the Suns are, at least in this measure, capable of winning a championship.  Their differential between offensive and defensive A:FGM, by the way, is the best in the league.

The team with the next best chance is the Boston Celtics.  Offensively, they assist on 61.5% of their field goals while holding opponents to assisting on just 51.2% of their made field goals.  These numbers are good enough for best in the east and second best overall in terms of differential to the Suns.  These numbers are no surprise.  In fact, I would venture to say that if Boston had their entire roster available for the entire season, they would likely meet the criteria as established.

The next best team, according to the measure, is the Utah Jazz.  Really?  Yes.  The Jazz have the best percentage of assists to field goals made in the league at 66.1%.  Their defense isn't too shabby either, limiting teams to just 56.2% assists to field goals made.  Their halfcourt offensive is efficient, and their flex-action baseline screens yields a high number of layups off of direct passes.

The entire list of playoff teams is available below.  Note that for some teams, these stats do not include their final regular season game of the year, as I put this table together on the final night of the regular season.

Western Conference:

Eastern Conference: